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Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment begins by making clear 
that “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside.”1  Questions about the scope of this 
birthright citizenship rule were largely settled by the late nineteenth 
century,2 and Congress has stepped in to provide statutory citizenship 
to those individuals born in the United States—namely Native Ameri-
cans—who have been found not to be constitutional birthright citi-
zens.3  The only remaining controversy regarding the scope of the Ci-
tizenship Clause involves whether children born to unauthorized 
immigrants (a category unknown at the time the Citizenship Clause 
was adopted), are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, 
thus making them birthright citizens.  This question launched an ex-
tended debate in the late twentieth century among scholars and ad-
vocates, largely as the result of the publication by Peter Schuck and 
Rogers Smith of Citizenship Without Consent in 1985, in which they ar-
gue that the original understanding of the Citizenship Clause did not 
support extending the jus soli rule to the children of the unauthor-
ized.4 
For all practical purposes, this debate has been resolved.  Though 
renewed interest over the last few years in immigration reform has 
prompted the introduction of legislation in Congress to deny the 
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 1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 2 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (holding that the children of 
Chinese immigrants born in the United States were citizens under Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, even though their parents were not eligible for naturalization under 
then-existing law). 
 3 See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizen-
ship Clause was not intended to apply to the children of members of Indian tribes born 
in the territory of the United States). 
 4 See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:  ILLEGAL 
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985). 
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children of the unauthorized jus soli status, these measures have been 
political non-starters,5 in large part because of the widespread view 
that the Supreme Court would strike down any such legislation as un-
constitutional.  In his contribution to this Symposium, Rogers Smith 
contends that the repeated acquiescence—of the people and of Con-
gress—in the application of the Citizenship Clause to the children of 
the undocumented has established the constitutionality of the prac-
tice, regardless of the scope of the Clause as it was originally under-
stood.  And thus, my purpose in this Article is not to provide yet an-
other response to the Schuck and Smith thesis,6 either by returning 
to the legislative debates surrounding the addition of the Clause to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, or by challenging the validity of original 
meaning interpretation.  Instead, I accept the relevance of original-
ism to constitutional interpretation and take the debate over the 
scope of the Citizenship Clause as an occasion to reflect on three cen-
tral challenges to the project of giving contemporary interpretive sig-
nificance to constitutional history. 
Understanding the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citi-
zenship Clause through an originalist lens requires that we address 
three important questions.  First, how do we understand the meaning 
of a constitutional provision that had a specific purpose when it was 
drafted but was nonetheless written in general language (to overrule 
Dred Scott v. Sanford7 but with neutral jus soli language)?  Second, what 
weight do we assign the Supreme Court’s first attempts to interpret 
the provision after its passage (the extension of the Citizenship 
Clause to children of immigrants not eligible for citizenship in Wong 
Kim Ark8)?  And third, how do we treat the original meaning of a con-
stitutional provision when the source of constitutional debate today 
stems from a set of facts that could only have been perceived dimly, if 
 
 5 For a scholarly claim to this effect, see PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP:  AMERICAN 
IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION 15 (2008) (observing that the debate over the citizenship 
of children of the undocumented is settled and that, even at the height of anti-immigrant 
sentiment in the mid-1990s, no bill proposing to deny the children of the unauthorized 
citizenship was voted out of committee, as well as the fact that such proposals have been 
roundly criticized by the press). 
 6 For examples of such responses, see Gerald Neuman, Professor, Columbia Law Sch., 
Statement Before Congress (1995), reprinted in T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, ET AL., 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAW AND POLICY (2008); T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Between 
Principles and Politics:  U.S. Citizenship Policy, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS:  MEMBERSHIP 
IN A CHANGING WORLD 127–28 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2000). 
 7 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that blacks were not citizens for the purposes of 
the Diversity Clause, because they were not regarded as capable of being part of the na-
tional political community at the time the Constitution was adopted). 
 8 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
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they were considered at all, at the time the provision was drafted and 
ratified (whether the Clause extends to children of unauthorized 
immigrants—a category of persons that did not exist in 1868)? 
The Citizenship Clause appears to establish a nearly universal jus 
soli, or birthright, rule:  “All persons born or naturalized in the Unit-
ed States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and the States wherein they reside.”9  Our starting point 
should be to lay out what we know about how this Clause was under-
stood at the time it was adopted.  Importantly, however, that inquiry 
should extend to a consideration of how we understand the meaning 
of the Citizenship Clause in the context of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a whole.  My argument ultimately is that if we understand the 
Fourteenth Amendment to embody an anti-caste or anti-
subordination principle, then we ought to read the Citizenship 
Clause in that spirit.  It ought to be given an egalitarian construc-
tion—a construction supported both by the original understanding 
of the Citizenship Clause and of the Fourteenth Amendment read as 
a whole, as well as by the early Supreme Court cases interpreting the 
Amendment. 
The Citizenship Clause, read in historical and textual context, 
represents our constitutional reset button.  It places all people, re-
gardless of ancestry, on equal terms at birth, with a legal status that 
cannot be denied them.  This egalitarian conception of citizenship 
status, in turn, ought to inform how we understand not just the sig-
nificance of the status of citizenship, but also the privileges and im-
munities of citizenship—a conclusion whose elaboration is beyond 
the scope of this brief Article but that should nonetheless frame the 
way we understand the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
our history. 
With respect to the original, specific intent of the Citizenship 
Clause, we know a few things about its original significance.  First, it is 
clear that it was intended to overrule the specific holding of Dred 
Scott—that blacks could not be citizens of the United States.10  This 
purpose was re-enforced several years later when Congress, pursuant 
to its naturalization power, passed a statute lifting restrictions on the 
naturalization of persons from Africa.  By extension, we can also rea-
sonably conclude that the Clause was intended to reject the concep-
tion of citizenship embodied in Dred Scott—that it was a function of 
the status or perceived capacities of blacks at various stages of Ameri-
 
 9 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 10 See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 4, at 74–77. 
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can history, or of whether a temporal majority or national polity un-
derstood blacks to be capable of being citizens.  In a sense, the Citi-
zenship Clause enacted a prophylactic rule against the majority’s abil-
ity to deny persons born in the United States the legal status of 
citizenship based on prejudice, or their socially constructed capacity 
for citizenship.  By overruling Dred Scott, then, the Citizenship Clause 
stands for the principle that citizenship is not earned; it is indefeasi-
ble (except eventually through the individual’s choice to renounce 
and other limited circumstances).11 
Second, we know that the rule was understood to extend beyond 
the specific case of former slaves or African Americans born in the 
United States, but that it was not understood to be truly universal—a 
fact reflected in the “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” qualification, 
whose meaning has been much debated since Schuck and Smith 
forced attention to the issue in 1985.  The Clause made clear that the 
common law rule of birthright citizenship, which up until the Civil 
War was understood to be the citizenship rule,12 at least as applied to 
whites, now applied without regard to race.  (At common law, the jus 
soli rule excluded children of diplomats and invading or occupying 
armies.)  That said, it was clear that the drafters of the Amendment 
did not intend for Native Americans to qualify13—perhaps the proxi-
mate cause for the Clause’s “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” quali-
fication.  The lingering question at the time was whether the Clause’s 
general language would extend to the U.S.-born children of Chinese 
immigrants (and Gypsies), who were ineligible themselves for citizen-
ship.  The possibility that the Clause’s general language would reach 
Chinese children was raised and debated in Congress, but it was not 
directly answered,14 and ambiguity as to whether the Clause extended 
to the children of Chinese immigrants persisted until the Supreme 
Court interpreted the Clause in Wong Kim Ark.15 
And thus, even if we can safely say that the birthright citizenship 
rule endows native-born Americans with equal legal status, we remain 
unclear as to how far this endowment extends, at least based on orig-
 
 11 See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (holding that a citizen’s participation in a 
foreign election did not reflect specific intent to renounce U.S. citizenship). 
 12 See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 4, at 42–71. 
 13 Id. at 80–82. 
 14 Id. at 77.  Also of note is the fact that President Johnson’s veto message accompanying the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866—the statutory precursor to the Citizenship Clause—interpreted 
the statute as applying to the Chinese and Gypsies.  See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 682 (cit-
ing President Johnson’s veto message). 
 15 See Bernadette Meyler, The Gestation of Birthright Citizenship, 1868–1898 States’ Rights, the 
Law of Nations, and Mutual Consent, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 519, 519–20 (2001). 
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inal meaning.  Because the original meaning does not answer this 
question in any specific sense (and in my view, even if it did, that an-
swer would not be dispositive), we must look for some kind of princi-
pled basis for addressing the scope question—one that we might 
nonetheless draw from the original and enduring ethos of the Four-
teenth Amendment as a whole. 
Again, in the nineteenth century, the open question as to scope 
was whether children born to immigrants who were not eligible to 
become citizens were covered.  Today’s analogue is the debate over 
whether the children of unauthorized immigrants fall within the pur-
view of the Clause—a question that would have made little sense at 
the time of the Amendment’s framing given that the category of “il-
legal immigrant” is largely a modern invention.16  The way the Su-
preme Court addressed the former question in Wong Kim Ark is ulti-
mately instructive as to how we might answer the latter question.  
Indeed, the two cases strike me as similar in all meaningful respects—
they both involve immigrant parents ineligible for full membership in 
the polity, or immigrant populations that were tolerated but dis-
dained or considered legally erasable.  The Court’s rejection in Wong 
Kim Ark of the notion that children born to parents ineligible for na-
turalization were not themselves the subject of the Citizenship Clause 
is a powerful rejection of the idea that one’s status depends on his 
parent’s status.  The question thus becomes how much weight we ul-
timately can assign this conclusion. 
My view is that, because the anti-inheritance rule is consistent with 
the egalitarian ethos and design of the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
whole, there should be a strong presumption in its favor.  This rejec-
tion of inheritance as a basis for standing in society is clearly present 
in the Constitution’s rejection of titles of nobility17 and is arguably a 
defining feature of American constitutional rights, with its focus on 
the individual.  Indeed, the principle that children or individuals 
ought not be bound by the status of their parents or ancestors per-
vades equal protection jurisprudence.  In his dissent in Korematsu v. 
United States, Justice Jackson wrote:  “Now, if any fundamental as-
sumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is personal and not in-
 
 16 For a discussion of the historical evolution of the category of illegal immigrant, see MAE 
M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:  ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 
(2004). 
 17 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
54, 76 (1997). 
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heritable.”18  And in Plyler v. Doe,19 Justice Brennan’s protection of the 
rights of unauthorized school children to attend the public schools is 
anchored in this same innocence principle—a concept that has deep 
roots in the original design of the Citizenship Clause. 
Though the Court in Wong Kim Ark did not put its holding in pre-
cisely these anti-inheritance terms, it did mobilize the Equal Protec-
tion Clause’s prohibition on race discrimination and the view ex-
pressed in the Slaughter-House Cases20—that citizenship is possessed 
without regard to ancestry—to interpret the scope of the Citizenship 
Clause.  The Court emphasized that the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to extend the common law rule without regard to 
race, thus harmonizing the Citizenship Clause with the overriding 
purpose of the Amendment—an intent that could not be squared 
with denying native-born Chinese children citizenship.21  What is 
more, in one particularly interesting passage, the Court asked how ci-
tizenship could be denied to the children of the Chinese when it ex-
tends to the children of Scottish, German, and other immigrants.22  In 
this sense, Wong Kim Ark seems to be adapting the anti-inheritance 
presumption for an immigrant society.  How can a society fed by im-
migrants maintain its commitment to equality without a citizenship 
rule that ignores the status of the parent?23 
 
 18 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  He continued by writing, “[H]ere is an 
attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a crime merely because this prisoner is the 
son of parents as to whom he had no choice, and belongs to a race from which there is 
no way to resign.”  Id. 
 19 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (observing that the Texas state law denying undocumented 
school children access to the public schools “imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete 
class of children not accountable for their disabling status”). 
 20 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 21 On this point, it may be possible to distinguish Wong Kim Ark from the case of unauthor-
ized immigrants on the ground that the concern in Wong Kim Ark was that the excluded 
class was defined solely in terms of race, whereas the children of unauthorized immi-
grants are not necessarily excluded on the basis of race, though it is hard to escape the 
possibility that race would come to define the excluded class of children of the undocu-
mented. 
 22 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 694 (1898). 
 23 The dissent emphasized the feudal nature of the common law rule and contested the no-
tion that birth in a territory denotes allegiance to that territory, arguing instead that a 
child is connected to the body politic through the “moral relations of his parentage.”  Id. 
at 708 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).  And thus we have two unappealing principles at war with 
one another—that loyalty is determined by allegiance owed at birth to a land and its lord, 
and that status is inherited. 
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More generally, the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole protects 
even “disfavored” individuals,24 suggesting support for an anti-
subordination view of the Amendment.25  The right question to ask 
when assessing the scope of the Citizenship Clause, then, is what 
would be its most egalitarian interpretation.  Apart from the clear ob-
jects of the Jurisdiction Clause—namely Native Americans (leaving 
aside the possibility that Elk v. Wilkins26 was wrongly decided), the 
children of diplomats, and the children of invading or occupying ar-
mies27—the more egalitarian rule is a universal birthright rule, not a 
rule that ties the status of children to their parents. 
To be sure, the fact that the Equal Protection Clause extends to all 
persons but that the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies only to 
citizens could be read to suggest that the Constitution tolerates tiers 
of membership.  Under this view, the failure to extend the Citizen-
ship Clause universally would not necessarily give rise to a caste sys-
tem because all persons without regard to status are shielded from 
arbitrary treatment by the government (though not by the federal 
government until 1954).  The rights-protective spin on this reading, 
of course, is that cases like Yick Wo28 and the universal language of the 
Equal Protection Clause actually mean that the significance of citi-
zenship is limited, and thus inequalities in the transmission of citizen-
ship might not threaten the egalitarian ethos of the Amendment. 
 
 24 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (applying the Equal Protection Clause to the 
Chinese and declaring a laundry permit ordinance unconstitutional as applied because of 
racial disparities in its application). 
 25 In the same era in which the Court decided Wong Kim Ark and Yick Wo, it also outlined an 
anti-subordination theory of the Equal Protection Clause by striking down a West Virginia 
state law that barred blacks from serving on juries, observing that the Amendment was 
meant to protect the former slaves from “unfriendly” legislation.  Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
 26 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
 27 Each of these examples is distinguishable from the case of the children of unauthorized 
immigrants.  The children of diplomats and invading and occupying armies are clearly 
citizens of foreign powers with no claim to long-term residence or loyalty to the United 
States, despite their territorial presence, and they are not subject to the laws of the Unit-
ed States as children of unauthorized immigrants would be.  The case of Native Ameri-
cans is more difficult because, as Schuck and Smith have shown, they were subject to the 
jurisdiction of the laws of the United States and understood in the ordinary sense of be-
ing punishable for violating the laws of the United States.  And yet, a strong case can be 
made that Native Americans are sui generis.  They always have been thought to have some 
kind of quasi-sovereign status and are therefore conceptually distinguishable from all 
other persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, even if their relationship to 
the U.S. sovereign is not the arms-length relationship characteristic of diplomats and in-
vaders. 
 28 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356. 
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And yet, if we follow the lead of cases like Strauder v. West Virginia,29 
and the work of the Court in the decades after the Citizenship 
Clause’s adoption, I think we can give voice to an anti-subordination 
ethos that embodies a generalized sense of original meaning and that 
can help us address the ambiguities that remain as to the scope of the 
Citizenship Clause.  It is at this stage that we cannot avoid experience 
or consequence-based considerations whose full significance can only 
be seen in light of recent history (though again, even as early as Wong 
Kim Ark, the Court appeared attuned to the consequences of a lim-
ited reading of the Citizenship Clause for a society made up of ra-
cially diverse immigrants).  It is hard to escape the reality that has led 
societies without a birthright citizenship tradition to converge in that 
direction because of the caste-generating consequences of permitting 
generations of children to grow up without formal citizenship.30 
In this sense, then, the original meaning of the Citizenship Clause 
can be said to address circumstances that were not contemplated 
when it was adopted.  A universal jus soli rule that limits the jurisdic-
tion-based31 exceptions to the obvious three cases of diplomats, in-
vaders, and Native Americans, is the broadest egalitarian construction 
we can give to the Clause.  It is thus consistent with the Clause’s orig-
inal meaning as understood in the context of the Amendment as a 
whole because it eschews the notion that parentage, ancestry, race, or 
any other inherited characteristic determines citizenship status.  That 
this is true is only strengthened by the empirical conclusions about 
the emergence of castes within societies with exclusive citizenship 
policies discussed above. 
 
 29 100 U.S. 303. 
 30 To be sure, countries such as the United Kingdom have amended their jus soli rules to 
make clear that they extend only to the children of persons lawfully present (possibly for 
permanent residence). See Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship:  A Comparison of Twenty-Five 
Nationality Laws, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY:  GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 17, 25 (T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001) (explaining the evolution of Brit-
ish citizenship requirements in the post-war era).  The Fourteenth Amendment is under-
stood to be an obstacle to such a change in the United States, though it is just as likely 
that a broad-based commitment to birthright citizenship and unease about transmitting 
the legal disabilities of parents onto children—a pervasive concern in interpretations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment present in Wong Kim Ark, Plyler v. Doe, and Justice Jackson’s 
dissent in Korematsu—present an equally significant obstacle. 
 31 It is worth taking note of the Court’s reasoning in Wong Kim Ark about the meaning of 
jurisdiction, which is based on a robust defense of sovereignty according to which even 
the temporary sojourner is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.  169 U.S. 649, 
683-87 (1897).  To hold otherwise would undermine the nation’s sovereignty.  While this 
framing may seem heavy-handed or paranoid today, it seems uncontroversial to me to say 
that jurisdiction extends to unauthorized immigrants and their children. 
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The jus soli rule is not, of course, perfectly egalitarian because it 
rests on an arbitrary distinction between persons born on opposite 
sides of a border.32  The rule is clearly under-inclusive because many 
persons not born in the United States are de facto members of our 
society and yet are not automatically entitled to citizenship.  And, it is 
also over-inclusive in that it makes citizens many people who will form 
no relationship to the United States33—a limitation that we accept 
largely because we understand the rule to be a prophylactic one, or 
one designed to prevent castes from arising.34  But that the anti-
inheritance principle does not produce globally egalitarian results 
should not reduce our commitment to reading the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as it governs the United States as a polity, as inclusively 
as possible, and thus without regard to parentage.35  To do so is to be 
true to the original anti-inheritance ethos of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, understood in its original textual 
and historical context. 
 
 32 See Eisgruber, supra note 17, at 59. 
 33 See SPIRO, supra note 5, at 20–25 (discussing the relationship to the United States of im-
migrants who give birth to children within the United States but later returned to their 
home countries, as well as the diasporic communities in the United States). 
 34 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, A Review of Peter Spiro, Beyond Citizenship:  American Identity 
After Globalization (2008), 103 AM. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2009). 
 35 Another principle that could be used to defend a universal jus soli rule is the responsive-
ness principle articulated by Chris Eisgruber, according to which the government must be 
responsive to the interests, or the control, of the members of the polity. See Eisgruber, su-
pra note 17, at 72–73.  The jus soli rule is the best way of ensuring that the members of the 
polity correspond to who actually lives and works within the society.  This principle is par-
ticularly salient during moments of large-scale immigration and it also counsels in favor 
of non-discriminatory and generous naturalization.  I think ultimately that among the 
reasons to value responsiveness is to ensure equality, and to protect disfavored groups 
from being targeted for arbitrary or oppressive treatment. 
